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Abstract 
To create the conceptual space to analyze the 
evident and structural similarities between the art 
experience, the (new) media experience, and the 
media art experience, the author approaches the 
“medium” as “techniques” which “make [the seen] 
strange.” A disruption of the perceptual process, a 
destabilization of the cognitive routines, a sudden 
sensitivity to the medium and an instant emotional 
response are at the heart of these (art) experiences. 
The author argues that the (well-studied) experience 
of the grotesque provides a model for the analysis 
of these (understudied) medium-sensitive 
experiences of the “strange” or “unnatural,” for 
which the grotesque experience is emblematic.  
Key words: art experience, new media experience, 
media art experience, medium-sensitive experience, 
grotesque experience, perceptual process, cognitive 
routines, (de)automatization, (de)stabilization, 
(de)naturalization, (de)sensitization, aesthetic 
category, embodied cognitions. 
In his contribution to an anthology on 
the grotesque from 2003, Noël Carroll 
wrote that from “a merely statistic point 
of view, the grotesque is one of the 
leading forms of mass art today. […] 
[T]he grotesque seems omnipresent. 
Thus it appears timely to address it 
theoretically.”1 Carroll’s approach of the 
grotesque is interesting in many ways. 
He analyzes Homer Simpson, Edward 
Scissorhands, self portraits by Cindy 
Sherman and other “grotesques” (see a 
Renaissance example in Fig. 1) as 
“structurally similar in that they all mix 
distinct biological and ontological 
categories.”2 As such, they “elicit certain 
affective states, namely, horror, comic 
amusement, and awe.”3 Carroll also 
argues that “these emotional responses 
have interesting family relations with 
each other and with the core structure of 
the grotesque.”4 Pivotal is the subversion 
of “our categorical expectations 
concerning the natural and ontological 
order.”5 To this we strongly respond: the 
categories of our understanding suddenly 
and momentarily fail, as Wolfgang 
Kayser rightly stated in his standard 
work on the grotesque from 1957.6
Though Carroll’s argument (in line 
with standard research on the grotesque) 
is convincing, his explanation for the 
current prominence of the grotesque in 
mainstream culture is less satisfying. He 
sees a relation with the present “quickly 
accelerating entertainment industry” 
(e.g., the demand for an endless variety 
of new and fantastic grotesque beings, 
triggering sudden and strong emotions). 
Yet he overlooks the current period in 
history as a medium-oriented7 one, with 
medium-sensitive viewers with a focus 
on new optical and digital techniques 
(e.g., C.G.I. or 3D on an IMAX wide 
screen). Moreover, he overlooks the 
perceptual experience of these new 
techniques – which almost inevitably 
“grotesquely” distort, fuse, enlarge 
and/or deform the seen, and thus 
typically fuse our biological and 
ontological categories and destabilize 
our cognitive routines – as a 
paradigmatic experience of the 
grotesque. In other words, the experience 
of the grotesque is not merely or 
exclusively a perceptual experience of 
grotesque beings (e.g., fused, enlarged, 
formless, gigantic beings): it is always, 
more basically, an experience of the 
distorting and destabilizing powers of 
the techniques involved in the perceptual 
process. Overlooking them (as well as 
their perceptual impact) is an inherent 
part of the problem under discussion. 
This can best be explained in terms of (I) 
being sensitized, followed by (II) being 
desensitized to the distorting powers of 
(new) techniques / media.  
Being Sensitized to Media 
I) Being sensitive or sensitized to a 
medium means, first of all, that new 
techniques which break the automatic 
routines of perception by “making [the 
seen] strange” notably slow down, 
complicate and deepen the perceptual 
process, and thus typically create, 
secondly, a sensitivity to the techniques 
involved in the process and an “art 
experience” (a prolonged experience of 
things “as they are perceived and not as 
they are known),”8 as Viktor Shklovsky 
explained, theorizing on the problem 
quite brilliantly in that other medium-
oriented interval in history, one marked 
by the “birth” of the cinema. In fact, it 
was the early cinema experience that 
sensitized him to the medium and made 
him theorize on the problem of 
“deautomatization” in his seminal “Art 
as Technique.” Note that a disruption of 
the perceptual process, a 
“deautomatization” of the cognitive 
routines involved in the process, and an 
instant emotional response are at the 
heart of these medium-sensitive 
experiences and that medium sensitivity 
and a prolonged [art] experience of the 
object may be triggered by all new 
techniques which have not yet 
established a stable relation to the 
perceptual-cognitive routines. Note also 
that with regard to their destabilizing 
perceptual potential “technique” 
(including artistic techniques), 
“technology,” and “medium” may be 
used as synonyms, as I do here, leaving 
other questions (e.g., regarding their 
technical specifics and effectual impact) 
unaddressed for reasons of conciseness. 
Note, lastly, that the problem of medium 
sensitivity underlying Russian Formalist 
art theory was basically overlooked in 
the post-war moment of their 
reintroduction to scholars outside Russia. 
I mention this here, because overlooking 
the impact of early cinema on Russian 
Formalism is in itself an ironic 
illustration of the fact that the 
destabilizing effect of new technologies 
on individuals and culture is indeed 
easily overlooked once the sensitivity for 
the technique is lost. Which brings me to 
my second point.  
Being Desensitized to Media 
II) Being desensitized to a medium
means that the sensitivity to the medium 
vanishes as the “strangeness effects” 
wear off due to the mechanisms of 
“habituation,” “automatization” or 
“algebraization.”9 This inevitably leads 
to a decrease of sensitivity to the 
distorting powers of these once new 
techniques, to the verge of percipients 
becoming almost fully insensitive to 
them. It automatically leads to a point 
where the presence of techniques in the 
perceptual process is not noted anymore: 
a swift shift from medium to mediated 
may become not only habitual, but even 
natural or “second nature.” Being 
perceived as “natural” indicates that, 
once the mechanisms of automatization 
enhance a smooth, swift and quick shift 
in the perceptual process from perceptual 
input to cognition, fully automatic and 
unnoticed by the percipients, they may 
altogether stop to take note of the 
ontological difference between a tree or 
cockroach in nature and one on a canvas, 
photo, TV, laptop or IMAX wide screen. 
It is for this very reason that the special 
ontological status of the image as 
“mediated” may automatically be 
overlooked and may well go 
unquestioned. This is in itself an 
interesting symptom of percipients being 
(fully) desensitized to a medium (e.g., 
television): it easily leads to an (almost 









full) identification of real and mediated. 
In other words, overlooking the medium 
is a predictable and almost inevitable 
consequence of the process of 
automatization: once techniques become 
second nature, we lose sight of them. 
Everyday percipients may find this 
adequate, as automatization enhances 
action as needed in everyday life. 
Researchers, however, may argue that 
research does not necessarily benefit 
from quick shifts from input to 
cognition, and that automatization 
facilitates a “dormative”10 use of an 
ambiguous11 and under-researched and 
basically primitive, magical or mythical 
notion of “form.”12 Moreover, they 
might argue that automatization 
facilitates a dominant research focus on 
the “real,” not on the medium. This may 
be referred to as the realist fallacy in 
research: desensitized to its effects, 
realists basically leave the media effects 
and the medium-sensitive experience 
understudied. In light of the above one 
must conclude that overlooking the 
medium is a fundamental and structural 
phenomenon, also in the field of 
research, and that automatization is the 
mechanism underlying the phenomenon. 
A second phenomenon which should be 
mentioned here is what I would refer to 
as the modernist fallacy. Some artists 
and artist-researchers, sensitized by new 
media (e.g., avant-gardists; new media 
enthusiasts), do not overlook the 
medium’s impact but tend to take the 
disruptive effects of new techniques to 
be “auretic” (to use Benjamin’s words): 
powerful and highly appreciated 
evocative effects which are then framed 
in research as artistic techniques, 
purposefully used and shaped as part of 
an art work. Yet I would argue that the 
really interesting phenomenon with 
regard to (new media and) medium 
sensitivity - which should make 
researchers want to reconsider the 
problem altogether - is that all new 
techniques working on the senses 
evidently possess a destabilizing 
potential, which easily materializes and 
becomes manifest, inside or outside 
artistic practices: new techniques notably 
“distort” the seen or heard, thus also 
typically triggering a discourse on the 
“new” as a confrontation with the 
“distorted” or “unnatural,” as discourses 
over time have testified – which brings 
me back to the grotesque. Memorable 
examples are to be found in art history 
and the history of the cinema, including 
the recent IMAX cinema experiences of 
a (computer generated) close-up of an 
Avatar on a wide screen of 200 square 
meters: such technical novelties in their 
moment of introduction, easily create a 
confrontational experience with 
something distinctly “unnatural,” 
“grotesque,” and “monstrous,” as is 
stressed in discourses under these 
terms.13 Phenomena like these not only 
point in the direction of the existence of 
(embodied) cognitions of natural 
proportions,14 but also clearly indicate 
that the perceptual-cognitive system is 
highly sensitive to the distorting powers 
of new (optical) techniques, as they 
destabilize the cognitive routines 
instantly and notably, yet only 
momentarily, as the destabilizing effects 
will be smoothed away over time in the 
process of automatization. Interestingly, 
this suggests that the twin mechanisms 
of deautomatization and automatization 
are constitutive of the fields of art and 
media respectively, and that the two are 
inherently connected. 
Findings
In addition to the standard works on the 
grotesque, I would argue that the very 
experience of the destabilization of the 
perceptual-cognitive routines by the use 
of new techniques creating a distinct 
experience of distortion of the natural 
order is constitutive of the category of 
the grotesque understood as an aesthetic 
category (Kayser, Kant). This should 
remind us that an aesthetic category is 
not merely or in the first place a class of 
objects (frescoes, paintings, pictures, 
statues, collages) produced in the course 
of history, but rather a class of aesthetic 
experiences. It should also remind us 
that the existence of this experiential 
category points in the direction of a 
highly sensitive cognitive “apparatus,” 
which clearly signals the use of new 
techniques: by marking the seen/heard as 
“unnatural.” Lastly, this should remind 
us that the relatively short intervals in 
history in which the grotesque bloomed15
need to be reconceptualized as medium-
sensitive intervals in history, which typi-
cally destabilize the ontological stability 
of mimetic tradition and produce new 
art, new insights and a new episteme in 
their wake. 
I cordially thank Ed Tan for his com-
ments on my article. 
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